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For decades, investment has been falling, living standards have declined, and inequality has
risen. What the Brexit and Trump campaigns shared was that they exploited the resulting
disaﬀection by blaming those problems on external forces, including globalisation. Yet these
problems were not the inevitable results of globalisation, but of domestic policy choices,
inﬂuenced by ﬂawed economic theories. Michael Jacobs and Mariana Mazzucato explain
why and how we need to rethink contemporary capitalism.
The election of Donald Trump, and the Brexit vote in the UK, have both been widely
interpreted as a revolt of the economically ‘left behind’: a protest by working class voters at
the impact of globalisation on their jobs and living standards. In neither case is this the whole
explanation: in both the UK and US, plenty of people on higher incomes and in wealthy areas
voted for the insurgent movement. But there can be little doubt that in Michigan and Merthr
Tydﬁl, South Carolina and Sunderland, the disaﬀection of people on below-average incomes
drove the outcome.
That voters should choose Trump or Brexit as the solution to these problems might remain a shock to many; the
fact of this disaﬀection should not be. In the US, median household incomes are basically the same today as
they were a quarter of a century ago – even though GDP has grown by almost 80 per cent over this period. In
the UK the phenomenon is more recent: while there has been a similar divergence between median income and
GDP growth over this long period, it is since the ﬁnancial crisis that the stagnation of wages has been really
marked. The median household disposable income in 2014-15 was barely back to its level of 2007-08. Indeed, in
no region of the UK outside London and the Southeast is output back to its pre-crisis levels. At the same time the
incomes of the richest 1 per cent in both countries have continued to surge ahead: in the ﬁrst three years of the
US recovery after 2008, an extraordinary 91 per cent of the gains in income went to the richest one-hundredth of
the population.
This should give economists and policymakers
pause for thought. It is hardly surprising that an
economic system which distributes its rewards so
badly should lose its popular legitimacy. It is of
course the paradox of what we may now need to call
the Brexit-Trump Syndrome – and it is a
phenomenon which may well be repeated in
European elections over the next few years – that
the political beneﬁciaries will be unable to address
their voters’ concerns. President Trump may
increase infrastructure spending, which (if properly
targeted and ﬁnanced) would be good, but he has
also pledged tax cuts for the rich and a trade war
with China, which would be disastrous. Brexit can
only damage the British economy – possibly
severely, if the UK leaves the single market and the
ﬁnancial sector loses its passporting rights to trade in the EU.
The parallels aren’t exact and should not be overplayed. But one feature that the campaigns shared was a
tendency to blame external forces for domestic economic problems. For real solutions, we need to look deeper.
For the huge rise in inequality and the loss of skilled jobs over the last four decades which have propelled Brexit
and Trump, results are not due to the unstoppable forces of globalisation. They are the result of active political,
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policy, and business choices. Rather than blaming others, it is these choices we should be questioning – and the
problematic economic theory which has inﬂuenced them.
Globalisation and technological change did not need to lead to the hollowing out of skilled jobs and downward
pressure on median incomes on the scale that has occurred in the US or UK. It is governments’ ability to shape
and create markets, and to negotiate their terms and conditions, that determines the kind of economy that
emerges from these global and technological forces. The tragedy of globalisation over the last 30 years is that it
has occurred at the same time as the dominance of an economic orthodoxy that saw the state retreat from active
economic management. The precise opposite was required: as international trade – which increases national
income but brings inequality and geographic dislocation – expanded, what was needed was a more active state
redistributing its rewards to develop the productive economy and to ensure fairer outcomes.
Instead, orthodox economic theory has guided poor economic policy. Take investment as an example, where
there has been a stark failure of both public policy and private action. Not only has the ﬁnance sector grown into
an increasingly unbalanced proportion of the economy, but the so-called ‘real’ economy has become increasingly
ﬁnancialised. Justiﬁed by the ideology of shareholder value, large US corporates have returned cash to
shareholders in record amounts to boost share prices (and with it executive remuneration) rather than reinvest in
future productive capacity. As the economist Bill Lazonick has shown, in the decade to 2003-2012, the largest
500 companies returned more than $2.4 trillion to shareholders in the form of share buybacks. Today, more than
$2 trillion of idle cash is sitting on the books of public companies in the US, rather than being reinvested, with a
further €2 trillion in Europe.
This private failure to invest is matched by a failure of public investment. The narrow debate on austerity since
the ﬁnancial crash has focused on the size of annual deﬁcits, rather than on the composition of public spending
and the contribution it can make to long-term growth. This problem is compounded by the orthodox economic
view that limits the role of public policy to correcting ‘market failures’. Firms are assumed to be ready and willing
to invest, with the role of policy limited to removing the barriers that might be inhibiting them from doing so. But
as Keynes noted, the ‘animal spirits’ that drive business investment must be created, they cannot be assumed.
Strategic investments by public agencies with public missions and purposes can shape and create new markets,
generating the desire to invest by businesses which see opportunities for future proﬁt-making.
What needs to happen is that the gains from globalisation and trade – which predominantly go to those on
higher incomes and particular sectors, such as ﬁnance and high-tech – need both to be taxed properly (with a
much stronger clampdown on tax avoidance and evasion) and to be reinvested in productive capacity and
innovation. Governments need to adopt a much more proactive economic strategy of supporting investment-led
growth, using ﬁscal powers, labour market regulation, public investment and ‘mission-oriented’ market creation
to shape economic development. They should also think much more creatively about how to socialise not only
the risks but the rewards of investments they have supported. In areas like drug pricing, patent laws and the
ﬁnancing of innovation, the state has been far too willing to take the costs while allowing the private sector to
reap the beneﬁts.
Why have governments not adopted proactive economic strategies of these kinds? A large part of the reason is
that for forty years they have been in thrall to a set of orthodox economic theories which have claimed they
would not work. The dominant economic consensus has been, rather, that ﬁnancial markets are eﬃcient,
corporations will best innovate and invest when left to themselves, rising inequality is the price to be paid for
growth, and the best role for government is to get smaller.
The great ﬁnancial crash and the profound failure of the austerity policies which followed it should already have
blown this orthodox economic consensus away. The Brexit-Trump Syndrome should ﬁnally bury it. It is not
simply that the public no longer believe in the prescriptions of economic orthodoxy, though that appears to be
increasingly the case. It is that the economic evidence does not support them. In fact, unregulated ﬁnancial
markets are prone to misallocating resources and creating asset bubbles which must inevitably burst.
Corporations and ﬁnancial asset holders seeking to maximise shareholder value tend to under-invest in long-
term growth. Innovation is best galvanised through a partnership of public and private ﬁnance. Public investment
banks can crowd in private capital when demand is weak. More unequal economies tend to have worse growth
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performance.
What is needed now is an economics based not on the abstract simplicities of ‘markets’ and ‘market failures’, but
on the evidence of how contemporary capitalism actually works, and why in key respects it now doesn’t.
Fortunately there are rich seams of thought in academic economics which can help to do this – those of Polanyi,
Keynes and Schumpeter, and the post-Keynesian, evolutionary, institutional and behavioural schools.
The Brexit and Trump electoral results make this increasingly look like the beginning of a new political era. If
policymakers are to respond in better ways to the new popular mood, they need to engage in a fundamental
rethinking of capitalism – guided by better economic theory and a more dynamic relationship between theory
and policy.
____
Note: the authors are the joint editors of Rethinking Capitalism: Economics and Policy for
Sustainable and Inclusive Growth (Wiley Blackwell, 2016). They are giving a joint lecture on the
arguments of the book at the LSE on 30 November, as part of the Ralph Miliband Programme: for
more information see here.
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